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Abstract
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the
setting where machines are strategic agents. In this problem, each job j has a length lj and each machine
i has a private speed ti. The running time of job j on machine i is tilj . We seek a mechanism that
obtains speed bids of machines and then assign jobs and payments to machines so that the machines
have incentive to report true speeds and the allocation and payments are also envy-free. We show that
1. A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot ap-
proximate the makespan strictly better than 2 − 1/m, where m is the number of machines. This
result contrasts with prior work giving a deterministic PTAS for envy-free anonymous assignment
and a distinct deterministic PTAS for truthful anonymous mechanism.
2. For two machines of different speeds, the unique deterministic scalable allocation of any envy-free,
truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism is to allocate all jobs to the quickest
machine. This allocation is the same as that of the VCG mechanism, yielding a 2-approximation
to the minimum makespan.
3. No payments can make any of the prior published monotone and locally efficient allocations that
yield better than an m-approximation for Q||Cmax [1, 3, 5, 9, 13] a truthful, envy-free, individually
rational, and anonymous mechanism.
∗This work was supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0728869 and CCF-1016778. Contact information:
{lkf,zhenghui}@cs.dartmouth.edu. Dept of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA. An extended
abstract will appear in SAGT 2011.
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1 Introduction
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan (i.e. Q||Cmax)
in a strategic environment. Each job j has a length lj and each machine i has a private speed ti, which is
only known by that machine. The speed ti is the time it takes machine i to process one unit length of a job
— ti is the inverse of the usual sense of speed. The running time of job j on machine i is tilj . A single job
cannot be performed by more than one machine (indivisible), but multiple jobs can be assigned to a single
machine. The workload of a machine is the total length of jobs assigned to that machine and the cost is
the running time of its workload. The scheduler would like to schedule jobs to complete in minimum time,
but has to pay machines to run jobs. The utility of a machine is the difference between the payment to the
machine and its cost. The mechanism used by the scheduler asks the machines for their speeds and then
determines an allocation of jobs to machines and payments to machines. Ideally, the mechanism should be
fair and efficient. To accomplish this, the following features of mechanism are desirable.
Individually rational A mechanism is individually rational (IR), if no agent gets negative utility when
reporting his true private information, since a rational agent will refuse the allocation and payment if
his utility is negative. In order that each machine accepts its allocation and payment, the payment to
a machine should exceed its cost of executing the jobs.
Truthful A mechanism is truthful or incentive compatible (IC), if each agent maximizes his utility by
reporting his true private information. Under truth-telling, it is easier for the designer to design
and analyze mechanisms, since agents’ dominant strategies are known by the designer. In a truthful
mechanism, an agent does not need to compute the strategy maximizing his utility, since it is simpler
to report his true information.
Envy-free A mechanism is envy-free (EF), if no agent can improve his utility by switching his allocation
and payment with that of another. Envy-freeness is a strong concept of fairness [10, 11]: each agent is
happiest with his allocation and payment.
Prior work on envy-free mechanisms for makespan approximation problems assumes that all machine
speeds are public knowledge [6, 15]. We assume that the speed of a machine is private information of that
machine. This assumption makes it harder to achieve envy-freeness. Only if the mechanism is also truthful,
can the mechanism designer ensure that the allocation is truly envy-free.
In this paper, we prove results about anonymous mechanisms. A mechanism is anonymous, roughly
speaking, if when two agents switch their bids, their allocated jobs and payments also switch. This means
the allocation and payments depend only on the agents’ bids, not on their names. Anonymous mechanisms
are of interest in this problem for two reasons. On the one hand, to the best of our knowledge, all polynomial-
time mechanisms for Q||Cmax are anonymous [1, 3, 5, 9, 15]. On the other hand, in addition to envy-freeness,
anonymity can be viewed as an additional characteristic of fairness [4].
We also study scalable allocations. Scalability means that multiplying the speeds by the same positive
constant does not change the allocation. Intuitively, the allocation function should not depend on the “units”
in which the speed are measured, and hence scalability is a natural notion. But allocations based on rounded
speeds of machines are typically not scalable [1, 5, 13].
The truthful mechanisms and envy-free mechanisms for Q||Cmax are both well-understood. There is a
payment scheme to make an allocation truthful if and only if the allocation is monotone decreasing [3]. For
Q||Cmax, an allocation is monotone decreasing if no machine gets more workload by bidding a slower speed
than its true speed. On the other hand, a mechanism for Q||Cmax can be envy-free if and only if its allocation
is locally efficient [15]. An allocation is locally efficient if a machine never gets less workload than a slower
one.
The complexity of truthful mechanisms and, separately, envy-free mechanisms have been completely
settled. Q||Cmax is strongly NP-hard, so there is no FPTAS for this problem, assuming P 6= NP. On the other
hand, there is a deterministic monotone PTAS [5] and a distinct deterministic locally efficient PTAS [15].
This implies the existence of truthful mechanisms and distinct envy-free mechanisms that approximate
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the makespan arbitrarily closely. However, neither of these payment functions make the mechanisms both
truthful and envy-free.
The VCG mechanism for Q||Cmax is truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous [8]. How-
ever, since the VCG mechanism maximizes the social welfare (i.e. minimizing the total running time), it
always allocates all jobs to the quickest machines, yielding a m-approximation of makespan for m machines
in the worst case. So a question is whether there is a truthful, envy-free, individually rational and anony-
mous mechanism that approximates the makespan better than the VCG mechanism. Since there already
exists many allocation functions that are both monotone and locally efficient, one natural step to answer
this question could be checking whether some of these allocation functions admit truthful and envy-free
payments.
Our Results. We show that
1. A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot approx-
imate the makespan strictly better than 2 − 1/m, where m is the number of machines. (Section 3).
This result contrasts with prior results [5, 15] discussed above.
2. For two machines of different speeds, the unique deterministic scalable allocation of any envy-free,
truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism is to allocate all jobs to the quickest machine.
(Section 5). This allocation is the same as that of the VCG mechanism, yielding a 2-approximation of
makespan for this case.
3. No payments can make any of the prior published monotone and locally efficient allocations that yield
better than an m-approximation for Q||Cmax [1, 3, 5, 9, 13] a truthful, envy-free, individually rational,
and anonymous mechanism.
Related Work. Hochbaum and Shmoys [12] give a PTAS for Q||Cmax. Andelman, Azar, and Sorani
[1] give a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism. Kova´cs improves the approximation ratio to
3 [13] and then to 2.8 [14]. Randomization has been successfully applied to this problem. Archer and
Tardos [3] give a 3-approximate randomized mechanism, which is improved to 2 in [2]. Dhangwatnotai [9]
et. al. give a monotone randomized PTAS. All these randomized mechanisms are truthful-in-expectation.
However, we can show that no payment function can form a truthful, envy-free, individually rational and
anonymous mechanism with any allocation function of these mechanisms. We give a proof for a deterministic
allocation [13] in Section 5 and another one for a randomized allocation [3] in Appendix B.
When players have different finite valuation spaces, it is known that a monotone and locally efficient
allocation function may not admit prices to form a simultaneously truthful and envy-free mechanism for
allocating goods among players [7]. In this paper, we consider mechanisms where all players have identical
infinite valuation spaces.
Cohen et. al. [8] study the truthful and envy-free mechanisms on combinatorial auctions with additive
valuations where agents have a upper capacity on the number of items they can receive. They seek truthful
and envy-free mechanisms that maximize social welfare and show that VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is
envy-free if agents’ capacities are all equal. Their result can be interpreted in our setting by viewing that
each agent has the same capacity n and the valuation of each agent is the reverse of its cost. So their result
implies that the VCG mechanism for Q||Cmax is truthful and envy-free; but the VCG mechanism does not
give a good approximation guarantee for makespan.
2 Preliminaries
There are m machines and n jobs. Each agent will report a bid bi ∈ R to the mechanism. Let t denote
the vector of true speeds and b the vector of bids.
A mechanism consists of a pair of functions (w, p). An allocation w maps a vector of bids to a vector
of allocated workload, where wi(b) is the workload of agent i. For all bid vectors b, w(b) must correspond
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to a valid job assignment. An allocation w is called scalable if wi(b) = wi(c · b) for all bid vectors b, all
i ∈ {1 . . .m} and all scalars c > 0. A payment p maps a vector of bids to a vector of payments, i.e. pi(b) is
the payment to agent i.
The cost machine i incurs by the assigned jobs is tiwi(b). Machine i’s private value ti measures its cost
per unit work. Each machine i attempts to maximize its utility, ui(ti, b) := pi(b)− tiwi(b).
The makespan of allocation w(b) is defined as maxi wi(b) · ti. A mechanism (w, p) is c-approximate if
for all bids b and values t, the makespan of the allocation given by w is within c times the makespan of the
optimal allocation, i.e.,
maxi wi(b) · ti ≤ c ·OPT (t),
where OPT (t) is the minimum makespan for machines with speeds t .
Vector b is sometimes written as (bi, b−i), where b−i is the vector of bids, not including agent i. A
mechanism (w, p) is truthful or incentive compatible, if each agent i maximizes his utility by bidding his true
value ti, i.e., for all agent i, all possible ti, bi and b−i,
pi(ti, b−i)− tiwi(ti, b−i) ≥ pi(bi, b−i)− tiwi(bi, b−i)
A mechanism (w, p) is individually rational, if agents who bid truthfully never incur a negative utility,
i.e. ui(ti, (ti, b−i)) ≥ 0 for all agents i, true value ti and other agents’ bids b−i.
A mechanism (w, p) is envy-free if no agent wishes to switch his allocation and payment with another.
For all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all bids b,
pi(b)− biwi(b) ≥ pj(b)− biwj(b).
Notice that we use bids b instead of the true speeds t in this definition, because a mechanism can determine
the envy-free allocation only based on the bids. However, a mechanism can ensure the outcome is envy-free,
only if it is also truthful.
A mechanism (w, p) is anonymous if for every bid vector b = (b1, . . . , bm), every k such that bk is unique
and every l 6= k,
wl(. . . , bk−1, bl, bk+1, . . . , bl−1, bk, bl+1, . . .) = wk(b)
and
pl(. . . , bk−1, bl, bk+1, . . . , bl−1, bk, bl+1, . . .) = pk(b).
The condition that bk is unique is important, because in some case the mechanism may have to allocate
jobs of different lengths to agents with the same bids. If mechanism (w, p) is anonymous and the bid of an
agent is unique, the workload of that agent stays the same no matter how that agent is indexed. So we can
write wi(bi, b−i) simply as w(bi, b−i) for unique bi to represent the workload of agent i. Similarly, we can
write pi(bi, b−i) simply as p(bi, b−i) for unique bi.
Characterization of truthful mechanisms
Lemma 1 ([3]). The allocation w(b) admits a truthful payment scheme if and only if w is monotone de-
creasing, i.e., wi(b
′
i, b−i) ≤ wi(bi, b−i) for all i, b−i, b
′
i ≥ bi. In this case, the mechanism is truthful if and
only if the payments satisfy
pi(bi, b−i) = hi(b−i) + biwi(bi, b−i)−
∫ bi
0
wi(u, b−i) du, ∀i (1)
where the his can be arbitrary functions.
By Lemma 1, the only flexibility in designing the truthful payments for allocation w is to choose the terms
hi(b−i). The utility of truth-telling agent i is hi(b−i)−
∫ bi
0
wi(u, b−i)du, because his cost is tiwi(ti, b−i), which
cancels out the second term in the payment formula. Thus, in order to make the mechanism individually
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rational, the term hi(b−i) should be at least
∫ bi
0 wi(u, b−i) du for any bi. Since bi can be arbitrarily large, hi
should satisfy
hi(b−i) ≥
∫ ∞
0
wi(u, b−i) du, ∀i, b−i. (2)
Characterization of envy-free mechanisms
An allocation function w is envy-free implementable if there exists a payment function p such that the
mechanism M = (w, p) is envy-free. An allocation function w is locally efficient if for all bids b, and all
permutations π of {1, · · · ,m},
m∑
i=1
bi · wi(b) ≤
m∑
i=1
bi · wpi(i)(b).
Lemma 2 ([15]). Allocation w is envy-free implementable if and only if w is locally efficient.
The proof of sufficiency constructs a payment scheme that ensures the envy-freeness for any locally
efficient allocation w. Specifically, assuming b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bm, the payments for related machines are the
following:
pi(b) =
{
b1 · w1(b) for i = 1
pi−1(b) + bi · (wi(b)− wi−1(b)) for i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}
These payments are not truthful payments, since p1(b) is clearly not in the form of (1). But the set of envy-free
payments is a convex polytope for fixed w, since payments satisfying linear constraints ∀i, j pi(b)−biwi(b) ≥
pj(b)− biwj(b) are envy-free. So there could be other payments that are both envy-free and truthful.
3 Lower Bound on Anonymous Mechanisms
In this section, we will prove an approximation lower bound for truthful, envy-free, individually rational,
and anonymous mechanisms.
Theorem 3. Let M = (w, p) be a deterministic, truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous
mechanism. Then M is not c-approximate for c < 2− 1
m
.
Since the only flexibility when designing payments in a truthful mechanism is to choose the his, we need
to know what kind of his are required for envy-free anonymous mechanisms. The following two lemmas give
necessary conditions on his.
Lemma 4. If a mechanism (w, p) is both truthful and anonymous, then there is a function h such that
hi(v) = h(v) in (1) for all bid vector v ∈ R
m−1
+ and machines i.
Proof. Let β be a real number such that β < minj vj . For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, define vector b
(i) =
(v1, . . . , vi−1, β, vi, . . . , vm−1), b
′(i) = (v1, . . . , vi, β, vi+1, . . . , vm−1). Since v = b
(i)
−i = b
′(i)
−(i+1) and M is
anonymous, it must be that pi(b
(i)) = pi+1(b
′(i)) and wi(b
(i)) = wi+1(b
′(i)). Since α < vj for any 0 < α <
β, j ∈ {1 . . .m− 1}, we also have wi(α, v) = wi+1(α, v) by anonymity. Thus, for truthful payments, we have
hi(v) = pi(b
(i))− βwi(b
(i)) +
∫ β
0
wi(α, v) dα = pi+1(b
′(i))− βwi+1(b
′(i)) +
∫ β
0
wi+1(α, v) dα = hi+1(v).
Lemma 5. Let L =
∑
k lk. If mechanism M = (w, p) is truthful, envy-free, and anonymous, then
h(t−i)− h(t−j) ≤ L · ti + (tj − ti)wi(t), (3)
for all t ∈ Rm+ and i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
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Proof. If machine j does not envy machine i, then pj(t)− tjwj(t) ≥ pi(t) − tjwi(t). Using (1) to substitute
in for pi and pj , and Lemma 4, this yields(
h(t−j) + tjwj(t)−
∫ tj
0
w(x, t−j) dx
)
− tjwj(t) ≥
(
h(t−i) + tiwi(t)−
∫ ti
0
w(x, t−i) dx
)
− tjwi(t).
Rearranging terms gives
h(t−i)− h(t−j) ≤
∫ ti
0
w(x, t−i) dx−
∫ tj
0
w(x, t−j)dx+ (tj − ti)wi(t)
≤
∫ ti
0
L dx−
∫ tj
0
0 dx+ (tj − ti)wi(t)
= L · ti + (tj − ti)wi(t).
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider n = m jobs of length l = (1, . . . , 1,m). Let L := 2m − 1 denote the total
length of the jobs. Define speed vector t = (mα, . . . ,mα, α), where α is a real number that only depends on
m and c and will be determined at the end of this section. We will show that if M is deterministic, truthful,
envy-free, individually rational and anonymous, it should allocate all jobs to the quickest machine in this
instance.
Claim 6. For speed vector t = (mα, . . . ,mα, α) and jobs l = (1, . . . , 1,m), if M is c-approximate and
wi(t) ≥ 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, then
h(t−1) ≥ (L+
m− 1
Lc
) · α.
Proof. Since M is truthful and individually rational, inequality (2) applies, and
h(t−1) ≥
∫ ∞
0
w(x, t−1) dx ≥
∫ α
Lc
0
w(x, t−1) dx +
∫ α
α
Lc
w(x, t−1) dx+
∫ mα
α
w(x, t−1) dx.
Apply M to vector (x, t−1). By the local efficiency of w, job m should be assigned to the quickest machine.
So for x < α, w(x, t−1) ≥ lm. When x <
α
Lc
, all the jobs should be assigned to the machine with speed x for
a makespan less than α/c. Otherwise the makespan is at least α, contradicting M is c-approximate. Since
wi(mα, t−i) ≥ 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, monotonicity implies wi(x, t−1) ≥ 1 for all x ∈ (α,mα). Since
x ∈ (α,mα) is unique in vector (x, t−1), we get w(x, t−1) ≥ 1 by anonymity. Thus
h(t−1) ≥
∫ α
Lc
0
L dx+
∫ α
α
Lc
m dx+
∫ mα
α
1 dx =
1
c
α+mα−
m
Lc
α+mα− α = (L+
m− 1
Lc
)α.
Let t′ = (1,mα, . . . ,mα, α). Applying M to t′, Lemma 5 implies
h(t′−1)− h(t
′
−m) ≤ L+ (α− 1)w1(t
′) ≤ L · α.
Since t′−1 = t−1, this implies
h(t−1) ≤ L · α+ h(t
′
−m). (4)
Claim 7. IfM is c-approximate, then h(t−1) < L·α+f(m, c), where f(m, c) = γ
m−1L+h(γm−2, γm−1, . . . , γ, 1)
and γ = cL+ ǫ for some 0 < ǫ < 1.
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Proof. Define speed vector t(i) = (γi−1, γi−2, . . . , γ, 1,mα, . . . ,mα) of length m for i ≥ 2, where γ = cL + ǫ
for some 0 < ǫ < 1.
Let us consider the allocation M makes to machine 1 for bid vector t(i). The speed of machine 1 is
γi−1 ≥ γ for i ≥ 2. The speed of machine i is 1. The makespan of allocating all jobs to machine i is L while
the makespan of allocating at least one job to machine 1 is at least γ = cL + ǫ. Since M is c-approximate,
this means w1(t
(i)) = 0. Using Lemma 5, we have
h(t
(i)
−1)− h(t
(i)
−m) ≤ t
(i)
1 L+ (t
(i)
m − t
(i)
1 )w1(t
(i)) = γi−1L.
Since t
(i)
−m = t
(i+1)
−1 , this implies h(t
(i)
−1) − h(t
(i+1)
−1 ) ≤ γ
i−1L for i ∈ {2, . . . ,m − 1}. Summing up these
inequalities on all i, we have
h(t
(2)
−1)− h(t
(m)
−1 ) ≤ L
m−1∑
i=2
γi−1 < γm−1L
Since t′−m = t
(2)
−1, we get h(t
′
−m) < γ
m−1L+ h(t
(m)
−1 ) = f(m, c). Plugging this into (4) yields
h(t−1) < L · α+ f(m, c). (5)
To complete the proof of Theorem 3, consider speed vector t with α = Lc
m−1f(m, c). If mechanism M
does not allocate all jobs to machine m, then wi(t) ≥ 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. Then Claim 6 implies
that h(t−1) ≥ α · L + f(m, c), contradicting (5). So M must allocate all jobs to machine m in this case,
yielding a makespan of (2m− 1)α while the makespan of the schedule that assigns job j to machine j for all
j is mα. Thus, M is c-approximate for some c ≥ 2− 1/m.
4 Characterizing Scalable Mechanisms on Two Machines
We show that known monotone and locally efficient allocations do not have payments to form truthful,
envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanisms. (See Section 5 and Appendix B.)
In this section, we will show that for two machines, there is just one deterministic scalable allocation that
can be made truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous. This allocation turns out to be the
same allocation as the VCG mechanism.
Lemma 8. Let w be a deterministic and scalable allocation function for 2 machines. For some k > 1, if
w(x, a) > 0 for all a > 0 and x < ka, then there is some g(k) > 0 such that
∫ ka
a
w(x, a) dx ≥
∫ a
a
k
w(a, x) dx+ g(k) · a.
Proof. For a < x < ka, let x = a
2
t
.
∫ ka
a
w(x, a) dx =
∫ a
k
a
w(
a2
t
, a)(−
a2
t2
) dt (integrate by substitution)
=
∫ a
a
k
a2
t2
w(a, t) dt (w is scalable)
=
∫ k+1
2k
a
a
k
a2
t2
w(a, t) dt+
∫ a
k+1
2k
a
a2
t2
w(a, t) dt
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For a
k
< t < k+12k a and k > 1, we have
a2
t2
≥ a2/(k+12k a)
2 = 4k
2
(k+1)2 > 1. For
k+1
2k a < t < a, we have
a2
t2
≥ 1.
Therefore,
∫ ka
a
w(x, a) dx ≥
4k2
(k + 1)2
∫ k+1
2k
a
a
k
w(a, t) dt+
∫ a
k+1
2k
a
w(a, t) dt
=
(
4k2
(k + 1)2
− 1
)∫ k+1
2k
a
a
k
w(a, t) dt+
∫ a
a
k
w(a, t) dt
We also have ∫ k+1
2k
a
a
k
w(a, t) dt =
∫ k+1
2k
a
a
k
w(1,
t
a
) dt = a
∫ k+1
2k
1
k
w(1, y) dy.
The first equality follows the scalability of w and we get the second equality by substituting t with ay.
Since w(x, a) > 0 for all a > 0 and x < ka, we have w(1, y) > 0 for y > 1/k. In sum,
∫ ka
a
w(x, a) dx ≥∫ a
a
k
w(a, x) dx + g(k) · a, where g(k) =
(
4k2
(k+1)2 − 1
) ∫ k+1
2k
1
k
w(1, y) dy > 0.
Theorem 9. Let M = (w, p) be deterministic, truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous. If
w is scalable, then for two machines of different speeds, w allocates all jobs to the quickest machine.
Proof. Let L denote the total length of jobs. First, consider two machines of speed t1 = 1 and t2 = a (a > 1).
Since M is truthful, envy-free, and anonymous, by Lemma 5, we have
h(a)− h(1) ≤ L+ (a− 1)L = L · a (6)
Since w is individually rational, h(1) ≥
∫∞
0 w(x, 1) ≥ 0. We will show that w(ka, a) = 0 for any k > 1.
For a contradiction, assume w(ra, a) > 0 for some r > 1. Let k be such that w(x, a) > 0 for x < ka and
w(x, a) = 0 for x > ka. By monotonicity, such a k exists. By the assumption that w(ra, a) > 0 for some
r > 1, we know that k > 1. Since w is scalable, we have for any x > ka, w(y, a) = w(a, x) = L if y/a = a/x,
i.e. y = a2/x < a/k. Therefore,
h(a) ≥
∫ ∞
0
w(x, a) dx
=
∫ a
k
0
L dx+
∫ a
a
k
w(x, a) dx+
∫ ka
a
w(x, a) dx
≥
L
k
a+
∫ a
a
k
w(x, a) dx+
∫ a
a
k
w(a, x) dx+ g(k) · a (Lemma 8)
≥
L
k
a+
∫ a
a
k
(w(x, a) + w(a, x)) dx+ g(k) · a
=
L
k
a+
∫ a
a
k
L dx+ g(k) · a
= (L+ g(k))a (7)
Take a > h(1)/g(k). We have h(a) > aL+ h(1) from (7). This contradicts (6).
5 Payments for Known Allocation Rules
Although the VCG mechanism is truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous, it does not
have a good approximation guarantee for makespan. In [13], the LPT* algorithm is described and shown to
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be monotone decreasing. In this section, we will show that LPT* is locally efficient and no payment function
can form an envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism with the LPT* algorithm.
We also prove a similar result for randomized mechanisms in Appendix B: the randomized 2-approximation
algorithm in [2, 3], whose expected allocation is monotone decreasing and locally efficient, admits no pay-
ment function that can make it simultaneously truthful-in-expectation, envy-free-in-expectation, individually
rational, and anonymous. We can show similar results with similar proofs for the allocations in [1, 5, 9].
The LPT* algorithm is the following: Let wji be the workload of machine i before job j is assigned.
Assume the jobs are indexed so that l1 ≥ l2 ≥ . . . ≥ lm. Note that this algorithm rounds the speeds and
hence is not scalable.
Algorithm 1 LPT* Algorithm
1: Define rounded speed of machine i to be si := 2
⌈log bi⌉.
2: for j = 1 to m do
3: Assign job j to machine i that minimizes (wji + lj) · si.
4: end for
5: Among machines of same rounded speed, reorder bundles on these machines so that a machine with
smaller bid gets more jobs.
Lemma 10. LPT* is locally efficient.
Proof. We need to show that wi(b) ≤ wk(b) for any bi > bk. If si = sk, then step 5 ensures wi(b) ≤ wk(b).
So suppose si > sk. Consider the last job, j, assigned to machine i. Since job j is assigned to machine i
rather than machine k, it should be that
(wji + lj)si ≤ (w
j
k + lj)sk,
where wji is the workload of machine i before job j is assigned. Thus,
wjk + lj ≥
si
sk
(wji + lj) ≥ 2(w
j
i + lj).
That is wjk ≥ 2w
j
i + lj. Since wk(b) ≥ w
j
k and wi(b) = w
j
i + lj, we get wk(b) ≥ wi(b).
Theorem 11. There is no payment function that will make LPT* simultaneously truthful, envy-free, indi-
vidually rational, and anonymous.
Proof. Let w denote the allocation of the LPT* algorithm. For a contradiction, assume there exists a payment
function p such that mechanism M = (w, p) is truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous.
Apply M to the problem of two jobs with lengths l1 = 2 and l2 = 1, and two machines with speeds
t1 = 1, t2 = a where a > 1 and a is a power of 2. By Lemma 5, we have
h(a)− h(1) ≤ 3 + (a− 1) · 3 = 3a. (8)
Since M is individually rational, we also have
h(a) ≥
∫ ∞
0
w(x, a) dx
≥
∫ a
4
0
w(x, a) dx+
∫ a
a
4
w(x, a) dx+
∫ 2a
a
w(x, a) dx
≥
a
4
w(
a
4
, a) +
∫ a
a
4
w(x, a) dx+ a · w(2a, a),
where the last inequality follows the monotonicity of w. Since a is a power of 2, the LPT* algorithm ensures
w(a4 , a) = 3 and w(2a, a) = 1. Since w is locally efficient, for any
a
4 < x < a, a machine with speed x gets at
least job one, i.e., w(x, a) ≥ 2. Therefore, h(a) ≥ a4 · 3 +
3a
4 · 2 + a · 1 =
13
4 a. Now take a = 8h(1), we have
h(a) ≥ 134 a = 26h(1) and h(a) ≤ h(1) + 3a = 25h(1) from (8), a contradiction.
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Theorem 11 implies that local efficiency and monotonicity of an allocation are not sufficient for the
existence of a payment function to form an envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mech-
anism. This insufficiency of monotonicity and local efficiency still holds, even if the allocation function is
also scalable. See Proposition 13 in Appendix C for more details.
6 Open Questions
In this paper, we establish an approximation lower bound 2 − 1/m for any deterministic, envy-free,
truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism while the upper bound is m given by the VCG
mechanism. So one open question is whether the VCG mechanism is the best among all truthful and envy-free
mechanisms.
The proof of Lemma 5 implicitly gives a characterization of mechanisms that are truthful, envy-free,
and anonymous. Ideally, there would be a characterization of allocations for which there exist prices that
make the resulting mechanism truthful and envy-free. Another interesting question is whether there is a
characterization of truthful and envy-free mechanisms for Q||Cmax.
References
[1] Nir Andelman, Yossi Azar, and Motti Sorani. Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish
related machines. 22nd Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pages 69–82,
2005.
[2] Aaron Archer. Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents. PhD thesis, Ithaca, NY,
USA, 2004.
[3] Aaron Archer and Eva Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proceedings of the
42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 482–491, 2001.
[4] Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, and Ron Lavi. An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling
mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 169–176,
2009.
[5] George Christodoulou and Annama´ria Kova´cs. A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related
machines. In Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
pages 1005–1016, 2010.
[6] Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky. Envy-free makespan
approximation: extended abstract. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,
pages 159–166, 2010.
[7] Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky. On the interplay
between incentive compatibility and envy freeness. http://arxiv.org/abs/1003.5328, 2010.
[8] Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky. Truth and envy in
capacitated allocation games. http://arxiv.org/abs/1003.5326, 2010.
[9] Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, and Tim Roughgarden. Truthful ap-
proximation schemes for single-parameter agents. In Proceedings of 49th Annual Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science, pages 15–24, 2008.
[10] L. Dubins and E. Spanier. How to cut a cake fairly. American Mathematical Monthly, 68:1–17, 1961.
[11] Duncan Foley. Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economic Essays, 7:45–98, 1967.
[12] Dorit S. Hochbaum and David B. Shmoys. A polynomial approximation scheme for scheduling on
uniform processors: Using the dual approximation approach. SIAM J. Comput., 17:539–551, 1988.
10
[13] Annama´ria Kova´cs. Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines. Algo-
rithms - ESA 2005: 13th Annual European Symposium, pages 616–627, 2005.
[14] Annama´ria Kova´cs. Tighter approximation bounds for LPT scheduling in two special cases. J. of
Discrete Algorithms, 7:327–340, September 2009.
[15] Ahuva Mu’Alem. On multi-dimensional envy-free mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 1st International
Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, pages 120–131, 2009.
Appendix
A Randomized mechanisms
In this section, we define the randomized mechanisms for Q||Cmax in our setting. A randomized mecha-
nism (w, p) is truthful-in-expectation, if each agent i maximizes his expected utility by bidding his true value
ti, i.e., for all agent i, all possible ti, bi and b−i,
E[pi(ti, b−i)− tiwi(ti, b−i)] ≥ E[pi(bi, b−i)− tiwi(bi, b−i)].
A randomized mechanism (w, p) is envy-free-in-expectation if no agent wishes to switch his expected allocation
and expected payment with another, i.e., for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all bids b,
E[pi(b)]− biE[wi(b)] ≥ E[pj(b)]− biE[wj(b)].
A randomized mechanism (w, p) is anonymous if for every bid vector b = (b1, . . . , bm), every k such that bk
is unique and every l 6= k,
E[wl(. . . , bk−1, bl, bk+1, . . . , bl−1, bk, bl+1, . . .)] = E[wk(b)]
and
E[pl(. . . , bk−1, bl, bk+1, . . . , bl−1, bk, bl+1, . . .)] = E[pk(b)].
So we seek randomized mechanisms that are truthful-in-expectation, envy-free-in-expectation, individu-
ally rational, and anonymous. For a randomized mechanism that is truthful-in-expectation, Lemma 1 still
holds after replacing all wi(b) with E[wi(b)] [3]. By Lemma 1, the payments are deterministic of a randomized
mechanism that is truthful-in-expectation. It is easy to check that (2), Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 still hold
after replacing the allocation of a machine with its expected allocation for all machines.
B
In [3], a randomized 3-approximation algorithm (see Algorithm 2) is described and its expected allocation
is shown to be monotone decreasing. In this section, we will show that its expected allocation is locally effi-
cient and there is no payment that makes it a truthful-in-expectation, envy-free-in-expectation, individually
rational and anonymous mechanism.
Theorem 12. There is no payment function that will make Algorithm 2 simultaneously truthful-in-expectation,
envy-free-in-expectation, individually rational, and anonymous.
Proof. Let w denote the allocation of Algorithm 2. For a contradiction, assume there exists a payment
function p such that mechanism M = (w, p) is truthful-in-expectation, envy-free-in-expectation, individually
rational and anonymous.
Apply M to the problem of two jobs with lengths l1 = 2 and l2 = 1, and two machines with speeds
t1 = 1, t2 = a where a > 1. By Lemma 5, we have
h(a)− h(1) ≤ 3 + (a− 1) · 3 = 3a, (9)
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Algorithm 2 Randomized 3-approximation Algorithm by Archer and Tardos [3]
Require: Jobs and machines are indexed so that l1 ≥ l2 ≥ . . . ≥ ln and b1 ≤ b2, . . . ,≤ bm.
1: Compute a lower bound of makespan
TLB(b) = max
j
min
i
max
{
bilj ,
∑j
k=1 lk∑i
r=1
1
br
}
2: For each machine i, create a bin i of size si(b) = TLB(b)/bi.
3: Assign jobs 1, 2, . . . , (k− 1) to bin 1, where k is the first job that would cause the bin to overflow. Then
assign to bin 1 a piece of job k exactly as large as the remaining capacity of bin 1. Continue by assigning
jobs to bin 2, starting with the rest of job k and so on, until all jobs are assigned.
4: For each job j, assign job j to machine i with probability equal to the proportion of job j that is
fractionally assigned to bin i.
where h(1) ≥
∫∞
0 w(x, 1) dx ≥ 0. The expected workload of machine i is equal to the size of bin i by step 4,
i.e., E[wi(b)] = si(b). Algorithm 2 also ensures that for all c > 0,
si(c · b) =
TLB(c · b)
c · bi
=
c · TLB(b)
c · bi
= si(b).
So we get E[wi(c · b)] = E[wi(b)] for all c > 0. This implies, for two machines,∫ ∞
0
E[w(x, a)] dx =
∫ ∞
0
E[w(
x
a
, 1)] dx = a
∫ ∞
0
E[w(t, 1)] dt,
where the last equality is obtained by substituting x with at. Since M is individually rational, we have
h(a) ≥
∫ ∞
0
E[w(x, a)] dx = a
∫ ∞
0
E[w(x, 1)] dx = (3.5 + ln 3− ln 2)a,
where we get the last equation by computing
∫∞
0
E[w(x, 1)] dx using the allocation of Algorithm 2. Now
take a = 2h(1), we have h(a) ≥ (3.5 + ln 3− ln 2)a > 7h(1), contradicting (9).
Since the expected workload of machine i equals to si(b) = TLB(b)/bi, we get E[wi(b)] = TLB(b)/bi ≥
TLB(b)/bj = E[wj(b)] for bi ≤ bj . So the expected allocation of Algorithm 2 is locally efficient.
C
Proposition 13. Local efficiency, monotonicity and scalability of an allocation are not sufficient for the
existence of a payment function to form an envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mech-
anism.
Proof. Define allocation w for 2 machines to be the allocation that minimizes the makespan. If there are
more than one such allocations, let w be the one that also minimizes the total completion time. It is easy to
verify that w is unique. Hence w is well-defined and anonymous. w is also locally efficient and scalable, since
it minimizes the makespan. Now, we show that w is monotone. Let the allocation of w for 2 machines with
bids (b1, b2) be O = (L1, L2). Assume w.l.o.g that b1L1 ≥ b2L2. If machine 1 increases its bid, its allocation
can only go down. Consider the allocation of w: O′ = (L′1, L
′
2) for 2 machines with bids (b1, b
′
2), where
b′2 > b2. For a contradiction, assume L
′
2 > L2. So L
′
1 < L1. If the makespan of O
′ is b1L
′
1, i.e. b1L
′
1 ≥ b
′
2L
′
2,
then we have b2L
′
2 < b
′
2L
′
2 ≤ b1L
′
1 < b1L1. So max{b2L
′
2, b1L
′
1} < b1L1. It contradicts the optimality of O.
If the makespan of O′ is b′2L
′
2, i.e. b
′
2L
′
2 ≥ b1L
′
1, then b
′
2L
′
2 ≤ max{b1L1, b
′
2L2} by the optimality of O
′. Since
b′2L
′
2 > b
′
2L2, we have b
′
2L
′
2 ≤ b1L1. So b2L
′
2 < b1L1. Since b1L
′
1 < b1L1, we have max{b2L
′
2, b1L
′
1} < b1L1.
It contradicts the optimality of O. Therefore, L′2 ≤ L2 and w is monotone. Since w is different from the
VCG allocation for 2 machines, this theorem follows from Theorem 9.
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